Undercover Mode — notes / nt and undercover / uc
EXP
A real, SD-backed Notes app that doubles as a disguise. To an onlooker the device just looks like a phone’s notepad — while your passive tools keep running and logging underneath.
Commands
CMD> notes # standalone Notes cover UI (no silent mode)
CMD> undercover # silent Notes disguise (the real cover)
CMD> uc set # set a secret exit passphrase
CMD> uc clear # remove the exit passphrase
CMD> uc status # show passphrase + boot-cover state
CMD> uc boot on # boot directly into Notes (no splash)
CMD> uc boot off # restore normal boot
CMD> uc panic set # arm an instant-hide key (press the key to bind it)
CMD> uc panic off # disable the instant-hide key
notes just runs the cover UI. undercover runs the same UI and raises the covert flag: notification sounds and the hidden-SSID beep go silent, and the real AL-ANQA status bar stays hidden. Passive tools (wguard, macwatch, espchat, …) keep running and logging to SD underneath — only the audible/visible tells go quiet.
Using the Notes UI
| Action | Result |
|---|---|
| Tap a card / trackball up-down + click | Open a note |
| Tap a line inside a note | Move the cursor there |
| Type / Backspace / Enter | Edit the note in place |
| Trackball up / down (in a note) | Move cursor a line at a time |
| Trackball left / right (in a note) | Move cursor a character at a time (wraps across lines) |
| Tap the save icon | Save to SD (toast: “Saved” or “No SD”) |
| Tap the + FAB | New note |
| Tap the back chevron | Return to the list |
Type the secret passphrase (uc only) | Exit silently to the CLI |
Press the panic key (default @) | Instantly drop into the cover from anywhere |
[q] | Exit — fallback only, disabled once a passphrase is set |
Notes are stored at /apps/notes/NNN.txt. No SD card → notes still work for the session (edit/navigate) but nothing persists across a reboot — no crash, just no save.
Security & OPSEC
- The passphrase is stored as
SHA-256(salt + phrase)in/config/undercover.conf— never in plaintext. - On a passphrase-match exit the open note is deliberately not saved, so the phrase’s own keystrokes (typed into the note before the match is detected) never reach the SD card.
- Typos you backspace-correct while typing the passphrase are handled — the match tracks your edited text.
Boot-cover
uc boot on boots the device straight into the Notes disguise — no AL-ANQA splash, no CLI flash. SD is read first so the flag is known before anything draws. If a lock PIN is also set (lock new + lock boot on), the lock screen fires after the passphrase exits Notes — so from cold boot through unlock an observer only ever sees Notes.
Panic key
uc panic set arms a single key as an instant-hide trigger. Pressing it anywhere — even mid-command (a scan, a monitor, an attack) — drops straight into the cover; type the passphrase to return. Default is @ (Sym+P), chosen to avoid clashing with index targeting like ps #2. It only fires once an exit passphrase is set (so there’s always a way back); reserved keys (', q, space, Enter, Backspace) are rejected. While armed, that key can’t be typed in commands (it hides instead); inside the cover it types normally again.
Touch wake (undercover only) — one tap wakes a half-dimmed screen; a double-tap (within 500 ms) wakes a fully screen-off device. The plain terminal and standalone notes never wake on touch.
Still TODO: a duress/decoy passphrase (a second phrase that opens a clean notepad under coercion) — not currently planned.
See also
- Lock Screen — PIN lock that stacks with the cover
- Home Launcher — the disguise base the cover is built on