Name Poisoner + NTLM Capture — responder / rsp
EXP
Answers Windows name-resolution broadcasts with the T-Deck’s IP, then presents fake HTTP and SMB login prompts to harvest NetNTLM hashes for offline cracking. Modelled on the classic Responder tool.
Own networks only.
Usage
Connect first (cw), then:
CMD> cw MyWiFi # connect
CMD> rsp # ACTIVE — poison name queries + run capture servers
CMD> rsp passive # PASSIVE — log queries only, transmit nothing
| Mode | Behaviour |
|---|---|
rsp (active) | Answers every LLMNR/NBT-NS/mDNS query — including wpad — with our IP, and runs the HTTP(:80) + SMB(:445) catchers |
rsp passive | Binds the listeners and joins the multicast groups (normal host behaviour), logs every observed name query, but never replies and never opens the capture servers — pure, silent recon |
The screen shows live LL / NB / MD query counters, a HASH counter, the most recent queried names, and the latest capture. Press q to quit.
What it poisons & captures
| Protocol | Port | Role |
|---|---|---|
| LLMNR | 5355 | name-query poison |
| NBT-NS | 137 | name-query poison |
| mDNS | 5353 | name-query poison |
| HTTP | 80 | NTLM / Basic auth catcher (+ serves a PAC to wpad requests) |
| SMB | 445 | NTLM catcher (SMB2 / SPNEGO) |
Captured hashes use a fixed 8-byte challenge (1122334455667788) so they’re crackable offline. NTLMv2 → hashcat -m 5600; NTLMv1 → -m 5500.
Output
A per-session folder /apps/responder/NNN/:
| File | Contents |
|---|---|
hashes.txt | hashcat-ready NetNTLM (v2/v1) |
creds.txt | HTTP Basic cleartext user:pass |
captures.csv | ms, proto, src, user |
queries.csv | every observed name query ms, proto, src, name |
Crack it on a PC:
hashcat -m 5600 hashes.txt rockyou.txt
Honest limits
- Hashes are for offline cracking — nothing is cracked on-device.
- The SMB2 path is best-effort/[EXP] — the SPNEGO framing is hand-built and may need iteration against a real Windows target. LLMNR/NBT-NS + HTTP capture are the reliable paths.
- The victim must actually attempt a name lookup / NTLM auth (a well-patched host with WPAD disabled may only leak the query name in passive mode).
- Not yet HW-tested against a live domain.